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Professional service providers who wish to organize as multi-person
rms have historically been limited to the partnership form. Such or-
ganizational forms trade the benet of risk diversication o¤ against
the costs of diluted incentives and liability exposure in choosing their
optimal size. More recently, states have permitted limited-liability
entities that combine the simplicity, exibility and tax advantages
of a partnership with the liability shield of a corporation. We de-
velop a game theoretic model of professional-rm organization that
integrates the provision of incentives in a multi-person rm with the
choice of business form. We then test the models predictions with
a new longitudinal data set on American law rms. Consistent with
our predictions, initial rm size is a strong positive predictor of sub-
sequent conversion to a new limited-liability form. Also consistent
with our theory, growth rate of small converters substantially exceeds
that of larger adopters; large converters grow more robustly than non-
adopters, however. These ndings suggest that while the promulga-
tion of new organizational forms has stimulated growth in the legal
services industry, the principal beneciaries of this growth have been
large, well established rms rather than small, entrepreneurial, bou-
tique practices.
PRELIMINARY DRAFT. Please do not quote or cite without permission. Thanks
to Bob Hillman and Larry Ribstein for helpful discussions. All errors are ours.
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1 Introduction
For much of the last century, service professionals (including accountants, at-
torneys and physicians) have faced a signicantly more limited set of choices
concerning organizational form than have their counterparts in other indus-
tries. By a combination of tradition, policy preference, and even accident,
courts widely held that professional services industries deserve special con-
sideration in light of the importance of personal skills and condentiality in
matters concerning the public trust.1 As such, groups of service professionals
were generally unable to organize themselves as anything other than general
partnerships, the organizational arrangement that continues to be the default
legal relationship for multi-person rms.2 Although partnerships have many
advantages (such as exibility, prot sharing, and pass through taxation),
they have a potentially signicant drawback: potentially unlimited liability.
Indeed, partners are jointly liable for all obligations incurred by any partner
on the partnerships behalf, and jointly and severally liable for wrongful acts
committed by a partner.3 This liability exposure creates a signicant risk at
the rm level, and, in the views of some, an impediment to the formation of
multi-person rms.
Perhaps persuaded by such criticisms, states began in the early 1980s to
allow professional services rms to adopt a special species of corporate status,
in the form of a professional corporation.Although originally motivated
for exploiting various loopholes in federal tax law,4 professional corporation
status also provided a potentially signicant liability shield for participants
that were not available under partnership law. Although largely retaining
personal liability for malpractice and other forms of professional negligence,
the professional corporation form provided some measure of relief against
other forms personal liability for the entitys obligations. Combined with S
corporation status (which was developed at around the same time), service
professionals were for the rst time able to enjoy many of the tax benets of
the partnership form while shielding participants from personal liability.
1See, e.g., Leventhal v. Atlantic Fin. Corp. 55 NE2d 20 (Mass. 1944).
2It is important to note that default does not mean dominant. Rather, if a business
organization comes into being without complying with statutory formalities for forming,
say, a corporation, it will be considered a general partnership by default.
3See, e.g., Uniform Partnership Act §§ 13-15 (1911).
4Economic Recovery Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981); Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97- 248, 96 Stat. 324.
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Nevertheless, from its initial statutory creation, professional corporate
status frequently proved to be an unpredictable refuge for rms, for at least
three reasons. First, many state statutes (once interpreted by courts and ad-
ministrative agencies) did not in fact extend signicant liability protection to
shareholders of professional corporations, largely limiting the advantages of
such forms to tax considerations (Maychek 1986). Second, notwithstanding
the existence of a professional corporation statute, state courts frequently
constrained the forms availability to certain professions (particularly attor-
neys).5 And nally, many states imposed other forms of restrictions on the
professional corporate form to make its adoption cumbersome, inexible, or
inconvenient. (Cox et al. 1996).6
Signicantly, however, just as the last few states were extending the cor-
porate form to professionals, a steady stream of jurisdictions began to em-
brace ever more novel statutory reforms authorizing the widespread use of the
limited liability company (LLC) and the limited liability partnership (LLP)
business forms. Statutes authorizing businesses to organize under these forms
were adopted either jointly or individually within every state and the District
of Columbia between 1977 and 1996.7 While sharing many of the character-
istics of the professional corporation, LLCs and LLPs were advertised to
have signicantly greater exibility, and signicantly more e¤ective liabil-
ity shields than their corporate forebears.8 And, while these business forms
were typically unavailable to professional services at the inception of an en-
5First Bank & Trust Co. v. Sagoria, 302 SE2d 674 (Ga. 1983).
6In addition, S Corporation status was perhaps only modestly attractive. First, the
benet was simply unavailable to large rms or rms with foreign participants, as sub-
chapter S is limited in applicability to companies with fewer than 75 shareholders, all of
whom must be United States citizens. Second, S corporations are often unable to deduct
the full expenses of many employee benet plans (as can C corporations), and are generally
unable to use basis step-ups to avoid certain tax liabilities upon a sale of assets or share
redemption. In addition, S corporations are allowed to have only one class of stock, which
limits the ability to allocate control decisions in a way di¤erent from cash ow rights. Fi-
nally, many state statutes still do not allow S corporations (or C corporations) to disclaim
responsibility for certain types of liability (malpractice, in particular).
7The statutory implementations are detailed in an appendix.
8At the same time, LLC/LLP also comes with a few costs. First, unlike corporations
(and even partnerships), these limited-liability rms may be required to have a limited
lifespan (frequently in the neighborhood of 35 years). While allowed to reform at the end
of this period, the terminal period itself can create both tax and strategic problems for
the rm. In addition, some states require that LLC/LLP rms maintain a certain amount
of insurance for satisfying other creditors.
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abling statute, states shortly began to extend them to professionals (subject
to certain restrictions) on a wide-scale basis throughout the 1990s.
There are some di¤erences between LLCs and LLPs, of course. For in-
stance, in some larger states (like California) professionals are limited to the
LLP form, while others (such as Illinois, until recently) have required the
LLC form. Moreover, the LLP form frequently does not provide the same
extent of liability limitation as does the LLC,9 and it is thought to impose
larger duciary duties on its members. Nevertheless, the LLC and LLP both
constitute important deviations from the status quo ante of the early 80s,
and therefore share more similarities than di¤erences.
In this study, we explore a simple but important question: How has
the increased availability of limited liability business forms over the last 15
years particularly LLCs and LLPs a¤ected organizational characteristics
of law rms? The simplicity of our research question, however, should not
obscure its importance. Indeed, legal services sector comprises a staggeringly
important component of economic activity. The tort system alone accounted
for $233.4 billion in expenditures in 2002, an amount representing over two
percent of gross domestic product, and more than twice the amount spent on
new automobiles during that same year. (Economic Report of the President
2004). Second, an ostensible rationale for introducing LLC/LLP business
forms to law rms was to catalyze growth, innovation and entrepreneurship
within the industry. Now that the experiment is substantially complete, we
are in a position to measure the e¤ectiveness of these legal innovations. Third,
legal practices constitute a highly visible population of rms, which lends
itself to somewhat accurate measurement. Indeed, there is relatively good
data available for the study of how law rms change in practice area, scope,
and size. And nally, the incremental introduction of limited liability forms
across states provides us with important statistical heterogeneity to measure
the importance of regulatory structure on the substantive boundaries of the
rm.
This study has two components, the rst theoretical and the second em-
pirical. The theoretical part is devoted to developing a testable model of
9Most notably, a number of states provide partners in an LLP only partial liability
shields against third party creditors (most notably, tort claimants alleging malpractice by
other partners). These partial shield states still allow for liability as to the LLPs general
debts, and include: Alaska, Louisiana, Ohio, Arkansas, Maine, Pennsylvania, District of
Columbia, Michigan, South Carolina, Hawaii, Nevada, Tennessee, Illinois, New Hampshire,
Texas, Kansas, New Jersey, Utah, Kentucky, North Carolina, West Virginia.
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professional-rm characteristics as a function of regulatory environment, fo-
cusing in particular on the package of regulatory instruments relating to lia-
bility. Our theory builds on the rich literature on multi-person organizations,
in which the tradeo¤ between incentives and risk sharing is a central focus.10
Increased size can diversify the business risk borne by each participant in a
traditional partnership, which unambiguously enhances the value of larger
scale. On the other hand, increased size can exacerbate agency costs, since
the direct return to e¤ort for a representative attorney becomes increasingly
diluted as rm size grows. Faced with these diluted incentives, clients may
be willing to make up for these costs by allocating greater amounts of incen-
tive compensation to the law rm. Our theoretical model predicts that some
rms are likely to attempt to use this response strategically, growing just to
the point where the client no longer nds incentive compensation worthwhile.
Moreover, for those rms that have such strategic incentives, the introduction
of new limited liability business forms is likely to be extremely attractive.
Using this framework, we predict that larger partnerships are dispropor-
tionately likely to embrace the new limited-liability forms, and that smaller
rms are unlikely to be a¤ected. Moreover, our framework predicts that of
the population of rms that do adopt the new forms, subsequent growth rates
will tend to be the highest among the rms within that population that are
more moderate in size.
Our second enterprise in this study proceeds to test our theoretical pre-
dictions with a large data set on law rms in the United States. The busi-
ness form, size and location of rms as of 1993 and 1999 was derived from
the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, perhaps the most comprehensive and
long-standing directory of the legal-services industry. Our data thus book-
end much of the time span in which states extended LLC/LLP structures
to professional rms. Our empirical approach complements Hillmans (2003)
examination of a mid-2002 snapshot of American rms, also derived from
Martindale Hubbell, in which the probability that a rm is an LLP increases
with rm size. Our longitudinal data permits an assessment of the evolution
of general partnerships in 1993 and in particular rm size prior and subse-
quent to the introduction of LLC/LLP forms for adopters and non-adopters.
The relative adoption of these forms among existing and new rms (in a sense
10Within this broad literature Gaynor and Gertler (1995), Lang and Gordon (1995), and
Liebowitz and Tollison (1980) are empirical analyses of the tradeo¤ between risk sharing
and incentives for professional rms, with the latter two focusing on law rms. None
directly addresses the issue of limited liability.
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to be made more precise) is informative about the costs of reorganization and
the lag between regulation and its consequences in this industry.
Ours is not the rst study to consider the e¤ects of new business forms on
law rm practice. Indeed, a distant cousin of our theoretical approach is Carr
and Mathewsons (1990) analysis of the balance between solo and two-person
practices o¤ers an interesting contrast. In their model consumers can o¤er
a lump-sum payment to a rm to be forfeited if an attorney is caught shirk-
ing. In a two-person rm one partner may credibly commit to monitoring
e¤ort through sunk investments in the rms reputation. Market equilibrium
follows from the relative benets and costs to consumers of representation
by a quality partnership, a quality solo practice, and a low-e¤ort solo prac-
tice. Carr and Matthewson conclude that limited liability is a temptation to
shirking that undermines the economic viability of quality partnerships. Our
analysis generalizes theirs by allowing rms of arbitrary size, and considering
the extent to which both size and organizational form may be strategic tools
used by rms. Moreover, unlike Carr & Matthewson, we attempt to test our
theoretical predictions with empirical data.
From an empirical standpoint, both Baker and Krawiec (2004) are also
concerned with law rmschoice of business form (if not rm size per se). The
authors describe a variety of economic considerations that may motivate form
choice and attempt to test among them. An analysis of a small, relatively
homogeneous sample rms with 25 or more attorneys based in New York
City yields no evidence of a relationship between the size of an existing rm
and its decision about reorganization. While LLPs do tend to be larger than
general partnerships in their sample, Baker and Krawiec do not pursue (as
do we) a comparison of size before and after reorganization.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 briey describes the route
through which states embraced the LLC/LLP forms, and how they were
adopted at the state level for law rms. Section 3 presents a theoretical
framework of optimal contracting, focusing specically on the relationship
between rm size and liability exposure. Using this framework, we generate
a core set of predictions, and in particular that (a) liability shields are more
likely to be adopted by larger rms than smaller ones; and (b) that rms
which do adopt them are likely to grow larger as a result. Section 4 describes
our data collection methodology, and provides some simple descriptive sta-
tistics. Section 5 then trains our attention more centrally on the hypotheses
that our theoretical model generates. We nd that both predictions nd
support in the data (although the rst appears to have the strongest amount
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of support). Section 6 concludes.
2 State Adoption Processes
Although all 50 states had passed LLC and LLP legislation of some kind by
the beginning of this century, the manner in which professional rms had
these choices available to them was considerably more circuitous. Indeed, by
historical precedent, professional rms were generally prohibited from form-
ing ordinary corporations, and thus the professional corporations statutes
of the 1970s and 1980s were devised especially for the sui generis purpose
of regulating law rm behavior. Similarly, then, it should not be surprising
to learn that in many states, professional rms were generally treated dif-
ferently upon the introduction of LLC/LLP statutes. Thus, while in some
instances, it is perhaps su¢ cient to use the e¤ective date of a general statute
to pinpoint the date at which law rms could enter alternative limited lia-
bility forms, that is the exception more than the rule. Indeed, it appears
to have been commonplace for state legislatures, for example, to promulgate
separate statutes that specically enabled professional rms to take the form
of LLCs or LLPs. In addition, state supreme courts frequently claim inherent
authority to regulate the legal profession, and therefore promulgate supreme
court rules to govern the practice (Donn 2004b).
The resulting landscape of general statutes, specic statutes and supreme
court rules presents challenges for those (such as ourselves) who wish to
categorize and date the e¤ectiveness of limited liability entity election across
all 50 states. In some states, for example, the availability of the form was
actually in a state of ux for some time, and the subject of intense litigation.11
In other states, an administrative court rule or a specic statute appears
merely to ratify an existing practice, thus indicating that the alternative
form was likely available from the onset of the statute.
Table 1 below presents our categorization of the availability of LLC and
LLP forms to law rms, noting (to the best of our ability) the e¤ective dates
in each state for the relevant enabling act (be it legislative, judicial, or ad-
ministrative).12 In most cases, these dates correspond to the e¤ective date
11Georgia is one good example. See Donn 2004b.
12These dates are drawn originally from Donn 2004a, but we went directly to the statutes
and rules to double check the dates given there. In this e¤ort the USC Law School reference
librarians (and particularly Brian Raphael) were extremely generous and helpful with their
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of a state statute that allows for the limited liability form for profession-
als, which may or may not have been promulgated subsequent to a general
statute. In other cases, the date refers to the date at which the state supreme
court rst gave o¢ cial authorization of the business form. In a few cases,
it appears recognized by practitioners that the general statute itself enabled
professional rms to utilize the entity form. The statutory authorizations
are more fully described in Appendix B.
Insert Table 1 Here
What factors would be important for a law rm that wished to convert
to choose between an LLC and an LLP? First, some states (California, New
Mexico, and Nevada) either strictly prohibit the LLC or its permissibility is
still in doubt. In these states, the LLP is perhaps the only viable option of
new limited liability entity. Second, however, it is important to note that in
approximately 12 states, the LLP statute allows for only a partial shield
on a rms liability. Within such partial shield states (with a few variations),
partners in an LLP, while not liable for other partners malpractice, are still
liable for more general obligations, a fact that can still yield signicant lia-
bility exposure.13 For example, unsecured creditors in the Arthur Anderson
bankruptcy attempted to use partial shield states to claim that they could
recover from the partners of Anderson, as those debts were part of ordinary
commercial debt.(Donn 2004). On the other hand, some practitioners claim
that it is still unclear whether LLC memberships are likely to be regulated
as securities one day, a risk that may make the LLC option less attractive.
In neither LLCs nor LLPs, however, are attorneys absolved from personal
liability for their own negligence or malpractice. Indeed, attorneys are strictly
prohibited from entering into contracts that limit their prospective liability
for malpractice with clients.14 As such, the advantage of the LLC/LLP
form would seem to accrue more centrally to multi-person rms (and as
we will argue below, particularly large ones). In fact, larger rms may be
able to substantially hedge even some of the risks of personal liability, by (for
example) purchasing malpractice insurance at the rm level.
time.
13The states are: Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See Donn 2004.
14See, e.g., Restatement (3rd) of the Law Governing Lawyers, at § 54(2).
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3 A Model of Optimal Contracting and Lia-
bility Shields
This section presents a framework to study the optimal organizational struc-
ture of professional rms. Given our data source, we will concentrate on law
rms (though our analysis is general to all professional services rms and
perhaps more broadly so). We endeavor to generate a model that reects
the pivotal real world relationships that we are interested in testing. Most
centrally, our model must provide a mechanism for law rm size and liabil-
ity shields to matter in some way. As noted in the introduction, there
are competing arguments about whether the introduction of limited liability
entities would favor small or large rms, and our model must make some
predictions along this dimension. Moreover, given that the risk of liability
is at the core of the attraction to limited liability, our model should allow for
attorneys to be risk averse, and for them to be able to hedge liability risk by
forming multi-person rms. The model should also include a rationale for
why attorneys bear any risk at all, which most who study the legal profes-
sion concur to be a signicant problem with agency costs at the lawyer/client
level.15
3.1 Basic Framework
Consider a population of N attorneys, indexed by i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng ; each of
whom has limited wealth w > 0 available to satisfy judgment creditors. The
parameter w reects availablewealth rather than actual wealth insofar as
the choice of organizational form limits the degree to which claimants can
recover against the personal assets of the attorney.
In every period, each attorney is assumed able to obtain a reservation
utility of u0 outside the practice of law (which we assume, for simplicity, to be
uniform across attorneys). If practicing law, each attorney is matched with
exactly one risk-neutral client. In addition, all attorneys are assumed to have
identical quasi-linear preferences in total wealth y, given by Ui (y) = v (y) i;
where i (described in greater detail below) constitutes the disutility of e¤ort
by the attorney. To capture the notion of risk aversion, we suppose that v (:)
15Although tax treatment of the entity is another factor that we consider important, we
have excluded it here to focus on liability aspects alone. Indeed, this was probably the
most important contribution of the LLC/LLP revolution for professional rms.
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takes on a simple mean-variance form as follows:
v (y) = E (y)    V ar (y) ; (1)
where the parameter  > 0 reects the attorneys marginal rate of substitu-
tion between expected payo¤ and risk.16
Attorney is e¤ort generates (stochastic) income for the client, denoted
by Zi: This value of the clients income, however, turns in part on the e¤ort
the attorney expends. In particular, we suppose that:
Zi =

0 w/ probability 1  pei
Z w/ probability pei
(2)
where ei 2 fL;Hg ; corresponding to low and high e¤ort, accordingly, and
where 0 < pL < pH < 1. It is assumed to cost cL for the attorney to take the
case and expend minimal e¤ort, and cL+ to take the case and expend high
e¤ort (thus,  represents the incremental cost of high e¤ort). We suppose
that each clients case is statistically independent of the others, so that for
any i and j; E (Zijei; Z i) = E (Zijei) :(In later drafts of this paper, we hope
to relax this assumption, in order to consider the e¤ects of rm scope as well
as size).
In the analysis below, we shall from time to time refer to the following
assumptions:




;  (1  pH)
	
:
Assumption B: pH = 1  pL
Assumption A is tantamount to imposing a condition that e¤ort mat-
terssu¢ ciently. In particular, high e¤ort must be su¢ ciently important to
justify its cost, and also that it must be large compared to the attorneys
level of risk aversion. While a violation of Assumption A would not un-
dermine our general analysis, the assumption is necessary if liability shields
are to have any discernible role on optimal rm size. Assumption B asserts
that the probability of a successful outcomes conditional on working hard
and shirking are symmetric. This is strictly a regularity assumption that
16A mean-variance approach to preferences may look on rst blush to be overly stark,
but it largely captures a more general class of models from nance in which payo¤s are
normally distributed. As we shall see below, the payo¤s of a multi-person law rm will
be approximately normal.
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simplies our analysis, but our core results hold under much less stringent
assumptions (at the cost of signicantly more notation).
At the beginning of each period, the client o¤ers the attorney a linear
compensation package to Ai consisting of a xed fee i and a percentage of
the clients prospective payo¤, i: We do not constrain the sign that either
of these parameters can take. However, to the extent that i is negative, it
cannot exceed the attorneys available wealth w: (Note that a negative value
for  can be thought to represent a type of performance bondanalogous
to damages that the client can collect in the event that the case is lost. We
elaborate on this point at greater length below).
Under this contract, attorney is individual expected gross payo¤ equal
to:
i + pei  iZi   i; (3)
and the variance of this gross payo¤ is:
(iZi)
2  pei (1  pei) (4)
so that if the attorney worked alone under the contract, her expected utility
would be given by:
i + pei  iZi    (iZi)
2  pei (1  pei)  i (5)
3.1.1 Firms
In addition to these basic aspects of the problem, we also include the possi-
bility that the attorney may be part of an m  person rm, or partnership
(where m = 1 represents the limiting case of a sole practitioner).17 Each
member of the rm faces a similar type of client (as reected by similar Zi).
All members/partners within a rm are assumed identical,18 and are assumed
17We place the term partnership in quotation markes since that term has legal signi-
cance beyond our intended use in this part of the paper. For now, we simply use the term
as a generic place-holder for a multi-person rm.
18Although we do not explicitly assume a role for associates or sta¤ in this paper, such
a role could be easily included here. For example, if each partner faced a technological
constraint imposing something akin to a Leontief production function on a clients project
(i.e., the case requires one partner, one associate, two paralegals, and one secretary), then
the framework we use above would readily apply, with the costs of support sta¤ factored
in as part of the cost of e¤ort. We abstract, however, from the question of agency costs
between the various players who provide litigation support, and focus solely on the agency
problem between lawyers (however constituted) and clients.
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to share equally in the gains and losses (to the extent that law allows) of the
partnership.19
Assuming that all attorneys in the partnership put forth the same e¤ort
level ei (an assertion that we shall conrm later constitutes an equilibrium),
the event of k victories within the partnership is distributed binomially with
parameters (m; pei) :Thus, the mean number of victories the rm obtains is
equal to mpei and variance is equal to mpei (1  pei) :20 Assuming that all
attorneys at the rm receive the same form of contract and contribute the
identical amount of e¤ort (an assertion we conrm below), the representative
attorneys expected utility if she is part of an m person partnership is given
by:








Note from (6) that holding the terms of the contract and the attorneys
e¤ort choice constant, the attorneys expected utility is increasing in m;
reecting a principal advantage of forming multi-person rms: the ability
to hedge risk. In addition to this benet, our analysis below demonstrates
that forming partnerships may also convey another advantage of creating a
collective action problem in the rm that the client will attempt to undo by
o¤ering substantial economic rents to the attorney.
3.1.2 Legal Liability
Finally, should an attorneys client lose a case, we assume that there exists
a noisy technology for adducing evidence about liability. In particular, this
evidence consists of a signal Ri that takes on values L and H according to
19The alert reader will note that this assumption is a bit of a simplication. In partic-
ular, most LLC/LLP statutes do not exempt professionals from personal liability, though
other partners/participants may be exempted. In such circumstances, losses are not
shared equally.
While we are sensitive to this criticism, the availability of indemnity agreements and
insurance carried by law rms may justify the simplifying assumption we make, so that
the rm internalizes the costs of liability on a symmetric, pro rata basis.
20Note also that for su¢ cently large values of m; the number of victories can be ap-
proximated with a normal distribution with meanmpei and variancempei (1  pei) : Thus,
since the returns for a law rm are approximately normal, our assumption of mean variance
preferences is somewhat more general than it rst appears. See note __ supra.
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the following probabilities:
Pr fRi = Hjloss; ei = eLg = L
Pr fRi = Hjloss; ei = eHg = H
Importantly, we assume that L  H ; so that evidence is helpful in ad-
ducing negligence. Thus, the signal Ri represents a noisy representation
about whether the evidence suggests that the attorney in fact worked hard
or shirked. For current purposes we assume that suit is free, but that litiga-
tion is limited in its ability to expose more than the true state of the world,
so that L = H = 1 : This assumption therefore constitutes a special case
corresponding to the situation where e¤ort is not veriable ex post,21 and
thereby allows us to capture the rms liability exposure through the value
of the contractual term : If  < 0; it represents the analog of the liability
sum that the attorney/rm must pay in the event of a loss.
3.2 Strategic Sequence and Player Objectives
Our model explores the competing choices that law rms and clients make
in interacting with one another. Partnerships choose their size m (and, in a
later section, they simultaneously commit to their organizational structure),
while clients choose the contractual terms they will o¤er the rm. Because
size and organizational structure are more di¢ cult to change in the short run,
it is appropriate to conceive of the rmsand clientschoices as occurring
sequentially.
Consequently, we characterize each players maximization problem as a
component of a sequential game, with the law rm moving rst and the client
moving second. Beginning with the latter, the client attempts to maximize
his own expected payo¤, subject to relevant constraints on the permissible
21The more general case would require considering an additional state to the contract.
There, it would necessary to subdivide the  component into two parts. Should the client
lose but the evidence reveals no shirking, or alternativley should the client win (and no
shirking is presumed), the xed component will be denoted as H : Conversely, should the
client lose and the evidence reveals shirking, the xed component will be denoted as L:
Thus, the introduction of legal liability suggests that each clients contract is given by
i; Hi ; Li
	
This leads to a much more di¢ cult approximation (through Chi-Squared rather than
normal, which becomes analytically less tractable).
13
contractual terms, the attorneys participation, and the attorneys incentives
to work hard. In particular, the client takes rm size m as given (as well as
the rms organizational form, when applicable), and chooses contract terms
(i; i)and an e¤ort level ei to solve the following program:
max
i;i;e2f0;1g
pe (1  )  Z   
s:t:
(W ) i   w
(IR)  (; ; e;m)  u0
(IC) e 2 argmax f (; ; e;m)g
(*)
The three constraints stated above are worth some reection, as they will
become central in the analysis that follows. The rst constraint (denoted as
(W)) states that while the xed component of the attorneys compensation
package can be negative (thus representing a form of liability / performance
bond), it cannot exceed attorney wealth. In what follows, we shall periodi-
cally refer to condition (W) as the attorneys wealthconstraint. Signi-
cantly, note that even in rms that consist of multiple partners and there-
fore have additional sources of wealth  this constraint remains as stated,
since every attorneys contract within that rm will (in equilibrium) places
an additional liability burden on the attorney that o¤sets the infusion of ad-
ditional resources. The second condition, denoted as (IR), states that the
compensation package must be such the attorney is at least as well o¤ under
the contract as he would be taking his outside option that earns u0: In what
follows we shall periodically refer to (IR) as the individual rationalitycon-
straint. Finally, condition (IC) states that the level of e¤ort the client wishes
to implement (i.e., e = H or e = L) is the attorneys optimal strategy under
his compensation package. We shall frequently refer to (IC) in what follows
as the incentive compatabilityconstraint. Let the solution to program (*)
be denoted as (; ; e) ; and note that each of these optimal choices will
generally depend on the value of m:
Anticipating the contractual terms that clients will o¤er, rms are as-
sumed to select their size (and later, their organizational structure) to max-
imize the payo¤ of their respective partners. Thus, the partnership chooses
m to solve the following program:
max
m
 (; ; e;m)
s:t:
(; ; e) = (; ; e)
(**)
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In order to characterize the equilibrium predictions of this game, we proceed
by backward induction, beginning with the clients contract design problem.
3.3 Clients Contract Design Problem
It is rst important to note that the client must choose between attempting to
implement high e¤ort and low e¤ort. The optimal contract can, in theory,
attempt to implement either, since for some parametric values, the client
would nd paying the attorney excess rents worthwhile, while for other values
the client would simply allow the attorney to shirk. Thus, the rst necessary
task is to consider the contracts that the client would choose under the
alternative assumption that she attempts to implement low versus high e¤ort
levels (respectively).
Implementing Low E¤ort Perhaps the simplest contract to analyze is
the one that implements low e¤ort. Indeed, given that the attorney benets
from a low e¤ort level, there is no need for the client to provide a countervail-
ing incentive to induce hard work by the attorney. Consequently, the client
can induce both participation:
Lemma 1: The optimal low-e¤ort inducing contract consists of a at fee
 = u0 + cL and no contingency fee so that  = 0: Under such a
contract the attorney expends e¤ort level eL:
The intuition underlying this result is very clear: All that is necessary to
induce the attorney to contribute the lowest possible e¤ort is to compensate
him for his opportunity cost of time. That is exactly what the above con-
tract does. Moreover, it is easily conrmed that so long as the costs and
reservation utilities are the same for all attorneys, the contract is the same
for all attorneys in the rm.
Implementing High E¤ort Let us now turn to the more interesting ques-
tion of how the client can implement high e¤ort. Unlike the case of imple-
menting low e¤ort, high e¤ort requires that the principal be willing to provide
an incentive to the attorney one that, signicantly, can take the form of
carrots or sticks (or a combination thereof). Analysis of this problem leads
to the following Lemma (whose proof  in addition to all others  can be
found in the appendix):
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Lemma 2: If Assumption B holds; the optimal high-e¤ort inducing contract




















Note from the lemma that the contingent amount  is strictly increasing
in m; and strictly decreasing in Z: This result is intuitive. First, as the
size of the partnership (reected by m) grows, free riding problems get larger
since each attorneys income turns less and less on his own case and more
on that of other partners. To counter this fact, the client has to o¤er more
in incentives to the attorney. On the other hand, as the stakes in each case
(reected by Z) get larger, the fractional share of those stakes the attorney
need claim grow smaller.
Note also that the xed component  is initially decreasing in m, but
it eventually becomes at at the point where it equals the representative
attorneys available wealth. The intuition here is simple: if the attorneys
available wealth is su¢ ciently large, then she can a¤ord to post a bond
enough to payfor the expected value of her future bonus should the case
come out victorious, and the wealth constraint never binds. On the other
hand, if the attorney is extremely wealth constrained, then she cannot a¤ord
to post a bond large enough to capture the expected value of her bonus. Here,
the (IR) constraint no longer binds, and instead the (W ) constraint must
become binding. When this occurs, client must o¤er the attorney more
carrots for producing a good result than sticks to punish a bad result.
Because the required incentive bonus grows larger as the size of the rm
grows, there exists a critical rm size beyond which the attorneys wealth
constraint becomes binding. Denoting this critical size by em; a little algebra






Thus, for all rms with size equal to or exceeding em; the high e¤ort inducing
contract must treat the wealth constraint as binding, and o¤er more carrots
than sticks to the attorney. For rms smaller than em; however, the wealth
constraint no longer binds, and the client can o¤er a contract that balances
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carrots and sticks, so that the attorney realizes no expected gain over his
reservation utility. Note that the critical threshold size ~m is always strictly
positive under Assumption B.
3.4 Optimal Contract
While the discussion above helps to characterize the type of contract the
client will o¤er for each level of e¤ort she might attempt to implement, we
have not yet considered which level of e¤ort is optimal from the clients
perspective. Analysis of the above constraints, however, immediately yields
this insight, which is reected in Proposition 1 and associated Corollaries:
Proposition 1: If Assumptions A and B hold, the client will choose to im-




m  (pH   pL) (pH pL)Z+(u0+cL+w)pH if m  ~m
m  (pH   pL)2 (pH pL)Z 2pH(1 pH) if m < ~m
(8)
Direct application of Proposition 1 immediately yields the following im-
portant corollaries:
Corollary 1A: If Assumptions A and B hold, then m > m:
Corollary 1B: If Assumptions A and B hold, then attorneys will earn pos-







(pH   pL)  Z  
(pH   pL)
 (1  pH)
  (u0 + cL) (9)
Corollary 1C: If Assumptions A and B hold, then attorneys will earn pos-




(u0 + cL + w) (1  (pH   pL) +  (1  pH)) + 
((pH   pL)   (1  pH))

(10)
Proposition 1 and Corollaries 1A-1C o¤er observations about the con-
tract that the client is likely to o¤er observations that are important for
considering the rms choice of size. The proposition shows that regardless
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of whether the wealth constraint or the participation constraint binds, there
exists a critical rm size above which the client is unwilling to implement
high e¤ort. Instead, for rms that exceed this critical size, the client will pay
for, expect, and receive a low level of e¤ort by the attorney.
Interestingly, the critical cuto¤s at which the client decides to implement
low e¤ort depend on whether the attorneys wealth constraint or the ratio-
nality constraint is binding for the high-e¤ort contract. Corollary 1A states
that the high e¤ort contract cuto¤ when the rationality constraint binds
(m) is smaller than the maximal rm size that will support high e¤ort
when the wealth constraint binds (m) this is important, since it suggests
that at times where the wealth constraint begins to bind, there may be a
discontinuous shift upwards in rm size. Corollaries 1B and 1C state that
if the rm is ever in a situation where wealth constraints bind, it is when
available attorney wealth is relatively low or (equivalently) when client stakes
are relatively large.
3.5 Firms Organizational Design Decision
We now proceed backward, asking what size the rm will create for itself
in light of the contract terms it expects its attorneys to receive from clients
(which take rm size into account). Although a direct application of Propo-
sition 1 implies the optimal size choice of a rm in the event that the at-
torneyswealth constraints are binding, when the IR constraint is binding
the attorneys are indi¤erent about size. Indeed, here, the client always
sets contractual terms so that the representative attorneys expected com-
pensation is precisely equal to his reservation utility. Nevertheless, while
the attorney is therefore indi¤erent between implementing a high-e¤ort and
low-e¤ort contract, the client strictly prefers a high-e¤ort contract, since the
client reaps the gains from that contract. Thus, in order to generate a more
precise prediction about rm size when the wealth constraint is not binding,
we need to incorporate an additional assumption. The weakest assumption
consistent with this intuition is as follows:
Assumption C: If the attorneys are indi¤erent, they will always choose an
organizational size that e¢ ciently supports high e¤ort ( e = H) rather
than low e¤ort ( e = L).
Assumption C states that at least when attorneys are indi¤erent in equi-
librium, they will choose an organizational choice that will support an e¢ -
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cient e¤ort level, and thus the attorney always receives a contract that has
both xed and contingent components. This seems a sensible choice, since
the parties would be throwing money away if the attorney chose a structure
that induced ine¢ cient low e¤ort. One can certainly imagine that prospec-
tive clients would be willing to make at least modest payments to rms that
organize themselves in a way that encourages e¢ cient legal representation.
With this assumption in hand, we can now proceed to state the following
Proposition:
Proposition 2: Suppose that Assumptions A, B, and C hold. If Z  Z;
the rm selects a size of m = m: Otherwise, the rm selects any size
m 2 [0;m]  [0;m] :
Proposition 2 states that the rms optimal choice of size turns crucially
whether the stakes of the average case in the rm are su¢ ciently large that
attorneys in that rm are likely to face binding wealth constraints. If so,
then the rms size choice is unique, and is equal to m: Conversely if the
rms cases fall short of this threshold, then the rm will choose a discernibly
more modest size.
Figure 1 makes this intuition more clear. In the gure, average stakes per
client are depicted on the horizontal axis and the rms size is depicted on
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the vertical axis. The threshold cuto¤ is denoted as Z in the Figure.
Note that when Z < Z

; the rms optimal size is relatively small, and
could be anywhere in the shaded region above the axis. However once Z
reaches Z

; the rm immediately grows in size to em; and grows along the
m schedule thereafter. From this gure, we can discern a sort of tipping
pointphenomenon: should the type of cases reach a threshold value of Z

;
it will experience rapid growth as it settles on a new trajectory. This will
prove to be an important observation as we turn our attention to the rms
organizational choice when a limited liability structure is made available. (A
similar graphical analysis applies to the rm size choice as w varies).
3.6 Allowing Alternative Business Forms
We now consider the central question in this paper: how are rm character-
istics (particularly organizational structure and size) likely to change when a
limited liability business form (such as with an LLC or LLP) becomes avail-
able? Although modeling the precise contours of a limited liability statute
would probably require tailoring for each states specic statute, there is one
feature that they all essentially share: the introduction of LLP/LLC status
has the e¤ect of reducing the amount of the attorneyspersonal assets that
are available to creditors. In essence, then, if a rm were to adopt a limited
liability regime, it would e¤ectively reduce the amount of available attor-
ney wealth w under an optimal incentive contract.22 In mathematical terms,
then, introduction of limited liability allows the rm e¤ectively to constrain
its membersavailable wealth to some w0 < w: The key questions for us here,
then, are: (a) What sorts of rms would opt to constrain themselves in this
way? and (b) How will a rms size change after it adopts (or fails to adopt)
limited liability status?
To answer this question, consider rst a rm that was already earning
positive rents under the status quo ante. Recall that such a rm tended to
have large-stakes clients and was therefore relatively large under the status
22We realize that this is perhaps a generalization, and there may be more subtle nuances
that the imposition of limited liability may have. However, the comparative statics
derived below capture the general avor of what such statutory innovation brings without
signicant technical details that are likley to distract the analysis more than change it.
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quo. For this rm, the representative attorneys indirect payo¤ is as follows:









At the optimal contract terms, the representative attorneys expected utility
exhibits the following comparative static on w :
d
dw












=   (1  pH)
(pH   pL)
< 0
Thus, large rms that already faced a binding wealth constraint would
strictly prefer to adopt LLC/LLP status, since it allows them to tighten up
that constraint even further, generating additional rents.
But in addition to these rms, the introduction of a limited liability busi-
ness form makes it potentially attractive for somewhat more modestly sized
rms to choose to convert. Indeed, for these rms, if w0 is su¢ ciently small,
the ability to adopt the limited business form may allow them to induce a
binding wealth constraint, thereby generating positive prots for the repre-
sentative attorney where before the representative attorney essentially broke
even. Such rms, consequently, will also nd it protable to convert.
Together, these insights generate the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Suppose that Assumptions A, B & C hold. If Z  Z;
the rm will adopt a limited liability business form when it becomes
available, and its rm size will shrink marginally in size. In addition,







will also adopt the limited liability




(u0 + cL + w
0) (1  (pH   pL) +  (1  pH)) + 
((pH   pL)   (1  pH))
< Z






will neither convert nor change in
size.
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Figure 2 helps illustrate the key intuitions of Proposition 3. In the gure, the
horizontal axis represents the available wealth of attorneys within the rm,
while the vertical axis represents the size of the rm. In the gure, we con-
sider two types of rms one with relatively large-stakes clients (represented
by ZH) and the other with relatively smaller-stakes clients (represented by
ZL < ZH). For either rm, however, we suppose that the available wealth
per attorney is initially equal to w > 0; but an option exists to adopt lim-
ited liability status, e¤ectively sharpening the wealth constraint at w0 < w:
As the gure illustrates, at the status quo ante, it is feasible for the large-
stakes rm to grow to the point where the wealth constraint is binding and
it derives positive rents,23 and thus it will choose a size of mH = m (ZH) .
For the smaller-stakes rm, however, the status quo ante is such that it is
not feasible to grow to the size where client pays the rm positive expected
rents,24 and thus the rm selects a size on the interval [0;m (w;ZL)] :With
the introduction of the limited liability form, however, the larger stakes rm
nds it optimal to convert, since so doing tightens the wealth constraint and
induces the client to pay larger rents on the margin. At the same time,
23To see this, note that at wealth w the value of m for the large-stakes rm exceeds
~m; and thus the rm has a non-empty interval of sizes that yield strictly positive rents.
24That is, m < ~m:
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however, the larger-stakes rm nds it optimal to contract slightly, from
mH to m0H = m
 (w0; ZH) < m
 (w;ZH) : Similarly, the smaller stakes rm
also has an incentive to convert, since tightening its wealth constraint to
w0 will now allow it to set size in a way that garners positive rents. As
such, the smaller stakes rm decides to grow inframarginally to a size of
m0L = m
 (w0;ZL) > m
 (w;ZL) :
3.7 Empirical Predictions
As the analysis above demonstrates, the introduction of limited liability is
predicted to have di¤erential e¤ects, depending on the underlying character-
istics of rms. First, we would predict that principally moderately large to
large nd it protable to convert, given that only those rms can use the
liability shield to garner larger rents from clients. Small rms, in contrast
(with smaller stakes clients) do not realize the benets of the limited liability
form, since clients can retain their expected revenues by ratcheting back the
xed component of compensation. Consequently, our rst prediction is that
moderate to large sized rms will systematically nd it protable to convert
to the new limited liability business form(s).
Second, for rms that are less than moderate in size, the introduction of
limited liability has no discernible e¤ects. Not only were these rms unable
to take advantage of the wealth constraint before the introduction of the
new form, but they remain unable to take advantage after its introduction
as well. Consequently, our second prediction is that non-converters will
systematically be comprised of smaller rms who have smaller stakes clients.
Finally, among those rms that convert, there are competing predictions
about size. For the moderately large rms near the margin that decide to
convert, we predict inframarginal growth, as the rms aggressively begin to
take advantage of the benets that the limited liability form o¤ers them.
For the larger rms, in contrast, we would predict a marginal reduction in
size (ceteris paribus), since adopting the limited liability form requires them
to scale back operations in order to continue to capture client rents. Conse-
quently, our third prediction is that among converting rms, the relative rate
of growth will be larger for moderate sized rms than it will for large rms.
Each of the above predictions is testable, and we are now in a position to
test our theoretical model against real-world data. It is to this task we now
turn.
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4 Empirical Strategy & Data
Our theory delivers predictions about the relationship between rmschar-
acteristics and the set of organizational forms available to the legal-services
industry. In particular, we predict that a rm that would operate as a general
partnership in the absence of an LLC/LLP option (due to tax or governance
considerations) has an incentive to reorganize under the new form that is
increasing in its economic scale. Furthermore, of those rms that do convert,
we would predict that the more modest sized rms have an incentive to grow
signicantly faster than larger rms who convert.
One approach to testing the theory would compare the distribu-
tions of rms by organizational form, economic scale and number of partners
among jurisdictions that di¤er in the set of permissible forms. The funda-
mental defect of this approach is that the counterfactual distribution of rm
characteristics when all jurisdictions have identical forms is unknown. Thus
it is di¢ cult to attribute any observed heterogeneity in the cross section to
di¤erences in the business form rather than some other factor.25
Our strategy, therefore, compares GPs that reorganize after the in-
troduction of new forms to those that do not, both prior and subsequent to
reorganization. This approach requires longitudinal data on law rms. The
remainder of this section describes a new data set on the characteristics
including business form, size and other measures scale, and location of law
rms in the fty states and the District of Columbia.
Our principal source for this data set is the Martindale Hubbell Law
Directory. Founded in 1865, Martindale Hubbell (MH) is the leading ref-
erence on the American legal-services industry. Consistent with a business
strategy of publishing a legal yellow pages, the Directorys coverage of the
legal universe ostensibly exceeds ninety percent in recent years.26 Electronic
25Moreover, the reorganization of general partnerships (GPs) cannot be distinguished
from the conversion of professional corporations to newer limited liability forms, because
our model does not address the choice between the latter forms.
26This gure is based on personal communication with a representative of MH. Hillman
(2003), who reasonably emphasizes uncertainty, cites coverage in the eighty to ninety
percent range. Given that listing in the Directory is voluntary, coverage is probably least
comprehensive for small rms, who have a weaker incentive to advertise. These rms are
not central to our analysis. Listings are free of charge (though the Directory gives greater
prominence to and detail concerning lawyers and rms that advertise).
We are indebted to an anonymous lawyer for his assistance in obtaining the 1993 and
1999 Directories.
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versions of the Law Directory from the fall of 1993 and the fall of 1999 were
obtained.27 As Table 1 indicates, our best information is that thirty-eight
states introduced the LLC form during this period, while forty-ve states
allowed LLPs.28
The Directory in each year included listings for both rm o¢ ces and
lawyers. A rm-o¢ ce listing reports the rm name (including organizational-
form designators, e.g., P.C.or variants thereof), rm size (including part-
ners, associates and in some cases support sta¤), and the city and state of
the o¢ ce. Firm-o¢ ce listings in 1999 also include a designator for the home
o¢ ce for some rms. A lawyer listing reports the lawyers name, title (if
any), and rm a¢ liation and location (if any).
Building the data set was challenging. Approximately eight hundred
thousand listings in the 1993 Directory were exported in batches of two hun-
dred. The similarly sized database for the 1999 Directory could be exported
more directly, though at the cost of the omission of some elds, including
reported rm size. In contrast with Hillman (2003), we derived rm sizes by
matching lawyers to rms. While our approach excludes the support sta¤
included in reported rm size, this procedure was imperfect, as when no a¢ l-
iated lawyers were matched. We have excluded 4,228 and 721 size-zero rms
in 1993 and 1999, respectively.29 Table 2 is an accounting of our treatment of
Excluding bracketing years, the gure for LLCs is twenty-nine states. The gure for
LLPs is unchanged. Because fall releases of the MH directory were obtained, we assume for
our purposes that a form was permitted in the year of actual introduction if the e¤ective
date preceded September and in the subsequent year otherwise.
27We are indebted to an anonymous lawyer for his assistance in obtaining the 1993 and
1999 electronic Directories.
28Excluding bracketing years, the gure for LLCs is twenty-nine states. The gure for
LLPs is unchanged. Because fall releases of the MH directory were obtained, we assume for
our purposes that a form was permitted in the year of actual introduction if the e¤ective
date preceded September and in the subsequent year otherwise.
29A size of zero is likely to indicate serious defects in our approach for imputing rm size.
This problem arose, for instance, when a lawyer records rm a¢ liation is Jane Q. Public,
Law O¢ ce of,while the corresponding rm record is Law O¢ ce of Jane Q. Public.We
have made substantial though incomplete progress in addressing such idiosyncrasies. We
are condent the data sets imperfections in representing the Law Directory are limited,
yet we continue to rene it. In seemingly rare instances the MH database itself includes
no a¢ liated lawyers for an apparently existing rm.
A potential advantage of our approach is that it produces a set of non-retired lawyers
apparently una¢ liated with any organization, whether a law rm, another business (e.g., as
corporate counsel), or a public concern (e.g., the armed forces, a district attorneys o¢ ce,
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issues we confronted in developing the present version of the longitudinal data
set. This table indicates that the exclusion of size-zero rms leaves 61,424
and 65,283 rms in 1993 and 1999, respectively. In comparison Hillmans
(2003) total was 65,139 for 2002.
Insert Table 2 Here
The home o¢ ce is imputed to be the largest o¢ ce whenever a home o¢ ce
is not designated in the MH database. The distributions of rms by state
of home o¢ ce for 1993 and 1999 can thus be reported in Table 3. These
distributions also correspond reasonably well to that reported in Hillman
(2003). Because the MH databases do not include a unique rm identier,
distinct rms with identical names (e.g., Brown and Brown, P.C.) are
aggregated into a single multi-o¢ ce rm.30
Insert Table 3 Here
Table 4 reports summary statistics on three measures of scale, namely
rm size (i.e., number of lawyers), number of o¢ ces, and number of states
with o¢ ces. Average rm size rose by almost twelve percent between 1993
and 1999. This increase reects any compositional e¤ect due to entry and
exit, as well as any changes in the average size of rms that continued to
operate. The average number of o¢ ces rose a little over nine percent, while
the average number of states in which the rms practice declined by almost
one percent.
Insert Table 4 Here
These scale measures exhibit substantial variation. The standard devi-
ation of rm size in 1999 is 27.1 lawyers, with the largest rm comprising
1,586 attorneys.31 A set of indicator variables for the state of home o¢ ce as of
or a court). Some of these lawyers are likely to be sole practitioners. There are 170,482 and
199,153 such lawyers in 1993 and 1999, respectively. We abstract from these potential rms
because our focus here is on rms that were GPs in 1993 and their appropriate treatment
is uncertain at present. Based on Hillmans (2003) methodology and rm count, these
potential rms are also excluded from his data set.
30With some e¤ort information in rm-o¢ ce records on the locations of a¢ liated o¢ ces
may be exploited.
31Figure 3 illustrates the highly skewed size distribution in 1993 among rms with
as many as fteen lawyers (the 95th percentile of the untruncated distribution). The
other distributions are similarly skewed. If small rms are indeed underrepresented in the
Directory, the true distributions are even more skewed.
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1999 was jointly signicant in ordinary-least-squares regressions of rm sizes
in 1993 and 1999.32 This nding reinforces our concern about potentially
unobservable heterogeneity.
Following Hillman (2003), rms were classied into one of ve broad
organizational categories, largely on the basis of any business-form designa-
tors in their names. These categories include professional corporation/professional
association (PC/PA), limited liability company (LLC), limited liability part-
nership (LLP), general partnership (GP), and sole proprietorship (SP). These
categories mask some potentially important di¤erences, e.g., in the extent of
the liability shield provided by the new limited-liability forms across states.
Hence care must be taken in our analysis to account for unobserved hetero-
geneity in the state-specic contours of the privileges and duties attaching
to forms. We rely on a state-specic compendium of organizational-form
designators for the PC/PA, LLP and LLC categories that Hillman (2003)
obtained from a review of state policies. Firms whose name lacks any of the
relevant designators were assigned to the GP and SP categories as follows: If
the rm is of size one or the term associatesappears in its name, the rm
is a SP.33
Table 5 lists the distribution of rmsorganizational forms in 1993
and 1999. Among jurisdictions that had introduced at least one of the
new forms as of 1999 (i.e., all states but Kentucky), GPs were the lead-
ing form in 1993, with 42.8% of rms, followed by PC/PAs (32.7%) and SPs
(24.1%). LLCs and LLPs together comprised a negligible 0.5% of all rms.
By 1999 PC/PAs were the leading form (47.2%), with the share of GPs hav-
ing declined somewhat (to 33.3%) and that of SPs moreso (to 8.7%). The
new limited liability forms accounted for 10.7% of rms.
Insert Table 5 Here
These gures include 1,932 (2,932) rms in 1993 (1999) with an organizational-
form designator not listed for the state in question in Hillman (2003) but
32Unreported results are available from the authors upon request. The F-statistic for the
state indicators is a highly signicant 9.31 in 1993. The R-squared of the size regression
was 0.0044.
33Hillman (2003) visually inspected the remaining rmsnames and categorized them as
SPs if a single surname appeared and as GPs otherwise. In contrast, we have not inspected
the names of potential GPs for the presence of a single surname. Also in contrast, in those
apparently rare instances in which a rms organizational designator appears in the second
line of the rm record, our parsing procedure does not ignore this information.
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always corresponding to a PC/PA for other states (e.g., Charteredand its
various abbreviations). We have, however, excluded 26 (48) rms in 1993
(1999) whose limited-liability form was impermissible according to Table 1.
While these cases may reect errors in our treatment of adoption dates, their
limited number is encouraging.34 Organizational distributions exhibited sub-
stantial variation across jurisdictions: state indicators were economically and
statistically signicant in a descriptive multinomial-logit analysis of the dis-
tributions of organizational forms in 1993 and 1999.35
The scale of rms tends to be quite di¤erent across broad organiza-
tional categories. Table 6 reports average scale by category in 1993 and 1999.
In both years GPs have slightly more lawyers on average than PC/PAs and
substantially more than SPs. In 1999 LLCs are somewhat larger than GPs
(7.8 vs 5.6), while LLPsmean size of 21.4 dwarfs all other forms.36 These
statistics suggest that the new limited-liability forms may be more impor-
tant than their shares of the total number of rms suggests. While rms in
general had more lawyers in 1999 than 1993, Table 6 indicates that GPs had
signicantly fewer lawyers in 1999. This may reect di¤erences in the scale
of those GPs in 1993 that do and do not reorganize (as well as entry, exit
and changes in unconverted GPs).
Insert Table 6 Here
We developed our longitudinal sample by matching rms in the 1993
and 1999 samples by name (exclusive of any organizational-form designators)
and location.37 Even had the MH databases included unique rm identiers,
34Additional explanations for these impermissible forms include: 1) our September
cuto¤ for the year of adoption is too restrictive (see footnote 11), 2) some rms convert
to test the boundaries of related legislation that was not explicit on these matters, and 3)
simple errors in a database as large as the Law Directory. We explore the robustness of
our results with respect to this issue.
35The chi-squared statistic for the 1993 (1999) sample was 6907 (8896), with 198 (196)
degrees of freedom. The pseudo-R squared statistics for these results were 0.049 and
0.0783, respectively. The sample for 1999 was restricted to states that had permitted
LLPs and/or LLCs as of 1999 so as not to conate state-level permissibility with variation
in permissible form choices.
36Qualitatively similar results hold for the relationship between number of o¢ ces and
the number of states with o¢ ces for GPs, LLCs and LLPs, except that 1) the scale is
compressed, and 2) the mean number of states is higher for GPs than for LLCs and LLPs
in 1993.
37Firm names in 1993 were often identical to those in 1999 except for commas between
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their value in this context is questionable. For instance, suppose that a
divorce among a rms participants results in the creation of two (smaller)
rms, whether of the original organizational form or not. A putative linkage
between either of these child rms and their parent would violate the ceteris
paribus assumption of our empirical strategy. Our procedure appropriately
does not match child rms to parents. The procedure also does not match a
rm that had included a new marqueepartner in its title.
Table 7 reports the number of rms matched in our 1993 and 1999 sam-
ples. For the 1993 sample 39.4% of rms were matched to the 1999 sample.
These rms account for 57.7% of lawyers in 1993. Among GPs in 1993, these
statistics are 49.6% and 64.6%, respectively.38
Insert Table 7 Here
The economic scale of rms is highly correlated across time. For instance,
Table 8 reports that the correlation between rm size in 1993 and 1999 is
0.9383. Scale in 1993 continues to be a powerful predictor of scale in 1999 in
regressions that include state-level indicator variables (which are themselves
highly signicant). This nding is consistent with stability in unobserved
rm-level characteristics that plausibly inuence the competitive landscape,
such as managerial talent.
Insert Table 8 Here
Table 9 reports the joint distribution of rms in our longitudinal sample
by broad organizational categories in 1993 and 1999 within adopting states.
The bold-faced row corresponding to GPs in 1993 is relevant to testing our
model. While 82.3% of these rms remained GPs in 1999, 12.7% had reorga-
nized under the new limited-liability forms (with the remainder converting
surnames in one year but not the other. Our matching procedure accounted for this
irregularity. The locational criterion is that the city and state of at least one o¢ ce in 1999
match those of at least one o¢ ce in 1993.
38These gures exclude a few hundred rms that are mistakenly matched due to an
error in our algorithm that we are now rectifying. These errors arise as in the following
example: Denote the 1993 rms Brown & Brown, PC in Washington, DC and Brown &
Brown in Houston, TX as A and B. Firm A continues in 1999 under the same form, while
rm B has changed its form to an LLP. Our algorithm strips rm A of its organizational
designator, mistakenly linking it to rm B in 1993, to which the 1999 counterparts are
then linked. Thus all four o¢ ces (i.e., two in each year) are aggregated into a singe rm
in our longitudinal sample.
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to PC/PAs). Thus our strategy of comparing the characteristics of GPs that
do reorganize after the introduction of new forms to those that do not has
some promise. No rms converted from a GP to a SP (or vice versa) after
we discarded from our longitudinal sample the 1,123 rms in which the rm
was of size one in one year but not in the other.39 Lastly, recalling Table 6,
the unconditional shares of LLPs and LLCs in the total number of rms in
1999 are substantially smaller for the longitudinal sample than for all rms
in 1999. A multinomial-logit analysis conrms that the shares of these new
forms di¤ers between matched and unmatched rms even after including a
highly signicant set of state indicator variables.40 A rm that operated in
1993 is 3.38% less likely to be an LLC and 1.78% less likely to be an LLP, all
else equal. These very large di¤erences (relative to the unconditional proba-
bility) suggest that the costs of reorganization plausibly constrain the share
of limited liability rms in the longitudinal sample.41
Insert Table 9 Here
5 Testing the Predictions
Our models specic predictions can be tested on our sample of GPs in 1993
that persisted into 1999. That is, are the GPs that reorganize under the
new limited-liability rms larger in economic scale than those that do not
(assuming that the cost of conversion does not rise too sharply with scale)?
Furthermore, does the number of partners grow for small rms that convert
at a rate that is higher than that of larger rms who convert? We address
each question in turn.
The rst question is whether larger GPs tend disproportionately to re-
organize as LLC/LLPs. Firm size (i.e., number of lawyers) is our preferred
measure of economic scale because of its greater variation than other mea-
39We veried that in some instances this is due to errors in parsing data from the Law
Directory, the structure of which varied between 1993 and 1999. We plan to explore this
issue further.
40The chi-squared statistic on the state indicator variables is 8428, with 196 degrees of
freedom. The pseudo-R squared of the multinomial-logit analysis is 0.0940. Note that the
samples in Tables 5 and 7 di¤er somewhat for the reasons just described.
41New rms have sunk no investment in a business form prior to entry. The incremental
cost of reorganizing is probably lower for existing rms that underwent other changes (e.g.,
gaining or losing marquee partners) than for stable rms.
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sures and its closer link to the theoretical model.42 While we intend to derive
information on partners from the MH databases in the future, we also use
rm size for now as a measure of the number of partners on the view that
these two variables move together.
Table 10 reports the average size of GPs in 1993 according to broad orga-
nizational category in 1999 for those jurisdictions that had permitted either
an LLC or LLP form as of 1999. The average size of rms that remained
GPs was 6.6 lawyers in 1993. In contrast, the average size of rms that
became LLCs by 1999 was 17.1, while that of rms that became LLPs was
40.2. These di¤erences are economically and statistically quite meaningful.
Insert Table 10 Here
We also estimated a multinomial-logit model of rmsbroad organiza-
tional categories in 1999 so as to account for other potential determinants of
form choice in 1999. The sample here includes Kentucky, which had not yet
adopted either new form, because variation in the set of permissible forms
can be informative about formsrelative attractiveness. The models covari-
ates include rm size in 1993, the number of states with o¢ ces in 1993, and
indicator variables for state of home o¢ ce. The number of states with o¢ ces
is included on the view that 1) multistate rms may nd conversion less at-
tractive if the other states of operation were slow to permit the new business
form, and 2) reorganizing in several states is likely to be more complex and
costly. State indicator variables are included because our organizational cat-
egories do not account for heterogeneity in the contours of the various forms
across jurisdictions. Moreover, reorganization may respond with a lag to the
introduction of these forms, and state indicators serve as controls for the year
of introduction.
Table 11 reports the results. With a pseudo-R squared of 0.1285, the t
of the model to the data is modest. Nevertheless, the estimated coe¢ cient
on rm size is highly signicant for both the LLC and LLP categories. The
coe¢ cient on number of states is signicant for LLPs and marginally for
LLCs. The set of state indicator variables is highly signicant in this model,
as expected.
Insert Table 11 Here
42That is, the law rms central problem is the elicitation of e¤ort from its professional
employees rather than the coordination of activity across o¢ ces and regions.
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Table 12 reports the estimated mean e¤ects of rm size and number of
states on the probability of reorganization under the LLC and LLP forms.
The probability of converting from a GP to an LLC increases by 0.024 percent
with each additional lawyer in 1993. The probability of conversion to an
LLP rises by a more substantial 0.31% at the margin.. The adoption of
new limited-liability forms must be even more responsive to the number of
partners. The probability of conversion to an LLP, however, declines on
average by 2.0% for each additional state in which a rm operates. Under
the interpretation of rm size as economic scale, the marginal impact of rms
size indicates that the cost of conversion cannot be rising too sharply with
scale. We know of no reason to believe that the cost of conversion is declining
sharply enough with scale to rationalize the conclusion that larger GPs are
more likely to reorganize as LLCs or LLPs. Taken together, these estimated
e¤ects are quite large e¤ects relative to the unconditional probabilities of
reorganization reported in Table 9.
Insert Table 12 Here
The evidence thus supports the hypothesis that larger GPs should be more
likely to avail themselves of the new limited-liability forms. The fact that
GPs with more lawyers were more likely to convert mitigates somewhat our
use of the number of lawyers as a measure of the number of partners. In larger
rms the technology of production for legal work is organized around teams
of lawyers, and there may be a relatively xed number of associates assigned
to the partner managing a case (as assumed implicitly in our theoretical
model).
Our model predicts that rms that the ranks of a rms partners should
decline post-conversion if the wealth constraint was binding, and vice versa.
The wealth constraint binds, if at all, for the largest rms. This implies that
small rms which convert should grow relatively quickly, and large rms
which convert should (ceteris paribus) contract post-conversion.
To test this hypothesis, we examined the median growth rate for law rms
grouped into deciles according to their size in 1993.43 Figure 4 illustrates
the results, with the outer lines representing ninety-ve-percent condence
intervals on the true medians.44 The median growth rate of rms in the
43The median is more representative than the mean by virtue of its relative insensitivity
to outliers. Table 13, which is discussed below, is consistent with this observation.
44A test of the null hypothesis of heteroscedasticity of unknown form was overwhelm-
32
smallest decile (with three or fewer lawyers) is roughly twenty-nine percent.
Median growth among all other rms is sharply lower at roughly twenty-one
percent. Growth exhibits no clear pattern with respect to the corresponding
size deciles.
Growth among large adopters of the new forms appears on rst glance
to be at odds with our models predictions. At the same time, however,
there may be a number of plausible explanations for this observation. Most
centrally, our model does not make any predictions about the distribution of
rms pre-conversion, but instead takes them as given. If, however, either
very few (or no) rms under the status quo ante were able to use size to
extract client rents, then most (or all) of the converters would be in the
category that we have called moderate, and we would predict them to
grow aggressively after conversion. This possibility (about which our model
has little to say) is roughly consistent with our data.45
Our empirical ndings were robust to a variety of concerns.46 First, the
results were qualitatively similar when economic scale and the number of
partners were measured by the number of o¢ ces and the number of states
instead of the number of lawyers. Next, we excluded rms in a handful
of states for which there was greater uncertainty about the permissibility
of the new forms.47 Lastly, we obtained similar results after 1) excluding
rms whose organizational designator does not appear in Hillmans (2003)
ingly rejected [White (1980)]. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are therefore
used. State indicator variables were included in the regression underlying Figure 4. These
indicators were highly jointly signicant.
This conclusion continues to hold when mean growth is considered.
45Another possible explanation for the apparent mismatch between our predictions and
the last set of results concerns exogenous growth. Our emperical e¤orts do not account
for independent secular growth within an industry. Table 13 reports mean and median
growth rates by broad organizational category as of 1999. The median growth rate is
positive and substantial for LLCs and LLPs and zero for GPs and PC/PAs. Thus larger
adopters indeed grew signicantly more robustly than rms that remained GPs. This is
inconsistent with our theory under the maintained hypothesis that rms that converted
would have grown like rms that remained GPs.
46We have not had an opportunity to explore the robustness of the latest version of the
data set, which incorporates LLP adoption dates (rather than assuming they are identical
to LLC adoption dates.) We will remedy this omission in future drafts.
47Contrary to Donn (2004b) and our best information, Baker and Krawiec (2004) state
that LLCs are impermissible only in New York, Nevada and Oregon. The timing of the
status of the new forms in Georgia and Tennessee for the period in question was di¢ cult
to ascertain.
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compendium yet always otherwise corresponds to the PC/PA form, and 2)
including rms with apparently impermissible forms. The evidence developed
here, then, is consistent in important respects with our model.
Nevertheless, the evidence is open to alternative interpretations. For
example, rm size is frequently thought to increase in managerial e¢ ciency
within a number of basic frameworks from industrial organization. Thus,
the growth trajectories we observe likely may reect di¤erences in overall
managerial talent. Moreover, able managers may be more likely to avail
themselves of protable opportunities, inducing a correlation between rm
size, growth rate and organizational form. We are contemplating empirical
strategies for distinguishing between this sort of explanation of rm growth
and our model, which predicts growth for strategic reasons. Some covariates
are plausibly correlated with the decision to convert but uncorrelated with
general managerial talent, e.g., the age of a rms partners, given that the
present discounted value of the return to reorganization may be declining
with age, while the psychic cost may be rising. Such exogenous variation in
the decision to reorganize may constitute valuable controls that we hope to
address in future drafts.
6 Conclusion
This paper has presented both theoretical predictions and an empirical test
for the e¤ects of the introduction of new limited liability forms as measured
by characteristics of professional law rms. We have found, consistent with
our predictions, that larger rms tended systematically to take advantage of
the new business forms, and growth rates were the strongest within the lower
deciles of the set of rms that chose to convert.
These ndings potentially have important consequences both for the study
of entrepreneurship within the practice of law, and regulatory policy more
generally. Indeed, if a goal of the introduction of the professional LLC/LLP
forms was to encourage entrepreneurial activity among small, boutique law
rms, the experiment has met with only limited success. The smallest rms
within our sample appear to have been largely una¤ected by the introduc-
tion of the new forms, as their scale was insu¢ cient to take advantage of
the strategic benets that the LLC/LLP forms o¤ered. However, among
more moderatelysized rms, which could take advantage of these benets,
we both predicted and found substantial growth. Larger established rms,
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however, also appear to have beneted from the new business forms.
From a general policy standpoint, our analysis has something to con-
tribute as well. Indeed, if as our theory and preliminary ndings suggest 
law rms strategically adopted the new business forms to extract rents from
clients, then it is unclear whether the benets of such activities is desirable
from a social perspective.
There are a number of extensions to this work that are well worth
considering. For instance, conversion rates and growth rates appear much
stronger in LLPs than in LLCs, a curious fact given that the LLP forms
o¤er, in the main, more modest liability protections. While some of this
di¤erence is certainly due to statutory restrictions (California, for example,
prohibits law rms from practicing as LLCs), there is almost certainly more
to the story here. Also worthy of investigation is the failureof PC/PAs
to exploit the potential tax advantages and administrative simplicity of the
new forms, as well as their very robust growth between 1993 and 1999. We
leave these explorations for future work.
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8 Appendix A:
This appendix contains the central proofs in the analytical results from Sec-
tion 3.
Lemma 2: If Assumption B holds; the optimal high-e¤ort inducing contract















1   (1  pH)
(pH   pL)

Proof: Suppose that all other attorneys are putting forth high e¤ort.
By also putting forth high e¤ort (assuming that all attorneys have identical
contracts of (; )); the representative attorneys expected monetary payo¤
will be
 + pH  Z   cL   




(1  pH)  pH
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On the other hand, by expending low e¤ort, our attorney can reap an
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Thus, the attorney will expend high e¤ort if and only if:
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Clearly, the client would like to choose the lowest level of  that induces the
attorney to expend high e¤ort. After some analysis,48 we obtain the following
IC constraint49 for the minimal level of  that is incentive compatible:













if pH = 1  pL
48Note that the LHS of the above expression is a concave down parabola whenver
(1  pH   pL) > 0; with one root at zero and one strictly positive root. Thus, any
 between the roots of the whole expression will solve. On the other hand, when
(1  pH   pL) < 0 the LHS is a concave up parabola with one root at zero and a strictly
negative root. Here, anything larger than the largest root will solve. Finally, when
(1  pH   pL) = 0; the LHS is linear in :
49Let  = Zm ; so the equation becomes:




Note that the simplest case is satised when pH = 1  pL: We focus on this
case in what follows (though our results generally carry over to both cases,
under some regularity assumptions).
To complete solving for the optimal high-e¤ort contract, then, we sub-
stitute the high e¤ort inducing terms  in and set  such that it satises
both the attorneys liquidity constraint and the attorneys participation con-
straint. So doing yields the result that only one of these constraints will be
binding. Thus, the expression in the Lemma simply captures whichever of
the constraints is the sharpes. QED.
* * *
Proposition 1: If Assumptions A and B hold, the client will choose to im-




m  (pH   pL) (pH pL)Z+(u0+cL+w)pH if m  ~m
m  (pH   pL)2 (pH pL)Z 2pH(1 pH) if m < ~m
Proof: When the client implements low e¤ort, her net expected payo¤
is given by:
pLZ   (u0 + cL)
This expected payo¤ does not turn on the size of the rm.
When, in contrast, the client implements high e¤ort, her payo¤ does turn
on m: Suppose rst that m  em (so that the wealth constraint binds). Here,
the clients expected net payo¤ is given by:








Here, then, the high e¤ort contract is favored by the client if and only if the
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m  m  (pH   pL)
(pH   pL)Z + (u0 + cL + w)
pH
38
If instead the client implements high e¤ort and m < em (so that the partici-
pation constraint binds), the clients expected payo¤ is given by:
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And accordingly, the client will induce high e¤ort if and only if:
m  m = (pH   pL)2
(pH   pL)Z   
2pH (1  pH)
which corresponds to the second condition in the proposition. QED.
Corrollary 1A: If Assumptions A and B hold, then m > m:
Corrollary 1B: If Assumptions A and B hold, then attorneys will earn pos-







(pH   pL)  Z  
(pH   pL)
 (1  pH)
  (u0 + cL)
Corollary 1C: If Assumptions A and B hold, then attorneys will earn pos-
itive economic rents if and only if Z  Z, where:
Z
  (u0 + cL + w)

1
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 (1  pH))
Proof of 1A: The proof consists of a simple comparison of m to m :
(m  m) = (pH   pL)
(pH   pL)Z + (u0 + cL + w)
pH
  (pH   pL)2
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follows from Assumption B.
Proof of 1B-C: Note from proposition 1 that the following decision rules
are adopted by the client:
m < ~m m  ~m
Implement High E¤ort If m  m m  m
Implement Low E¤ort If m > m m > m
So we still need to check whether the relevant regions described above exist,
and if they do, how the rm will organize itself. Our task is simplied a bit
by noting that the attorneys in a rm receive rents only when (a) high e¤ort
is implemented; and (b) the wealth constrained binds. Equivalently, then,
the operative region a rm nds itself in is where m 2 [ ~m;m] : Everywhere
else, they will earn no rents. However, in any event they will not earn rents
unless ~m  m. So the rst task is to ask when [ ~m;m] exists. For it to
exist, the following must be true:















(pH   pL)  Z  
(pH   pL)
 (1  pH)
  (u0 + cL)
,
Z  Z  (u0 + cL + w) (1  (pH   pL) +  (1  pH)) + 
((pH   pL)   (1  pH))
QED.
* * *
Proposition 2: Suppose that Assumptions A, B, and C hold. If Z  Z;
the rm selects a size of m = m: Otherwise, the rm selects any size
m 2 [0;m] :
Proof: If Z  Z; then under Assumptions A and B we know that
~m  m; and thus the rm will choose a size in the interval [ ~m;m] ; since
rents are zero for all other rm size. The representative attorneys expected
utility under an optimal contract for a rm size in this interval is given by:









Note that this value is strictly increasing in m; and thus the rm will grow to
the maximal size in this interval. If Z < Z

; in contrast, the representative
attorney will always garner zero rents, and thus the choice of organizational
size is not unique. However, Assumption C implies that this choice must be
on the interval [0;m] : QED.
* * *
Proposition 3: Suppose that Assumptions A, B & C hold. If Z  Z;
the rm will adopt a limited liability business form when it becomes
available, and its rm size will shrink marginally in size. In addition,







will also adopt the limited liability
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will neither convert nor change in
size.
Proof: The textual discussion demonstrates the proof for rms such that







; note that the Proposition is
simply a restatement of Proposition 2 evaluated at w0: The same is true for









The following table reports the timing and nature of events respecting the 
permissibility of LLCs and LLPs in each state.  Events refer to a favorable stance on form 
permissibility unless otherwise noted.  Where there are multiple events within a state, the 
date of the event that in our best judgment meaningfully permitted a form appears in bold 
face.  (The reported timing is with respect to the effective date of introduction, not 
necessarily the date of statutory authorization, etc.)  In general, when a statute 
specifically authorizing a business form for professionals follows a general limited-
liability statute, the form plausibly became available to professionals only with the 
specific statute.  A similar argument applies when judicial approval follows a general 
statute.  Other cases are more difficult.  While uncertainties remain, their relevance to this 
paper is limited to cases in which the timing relative to our bracketing years shifts.  For 
example, a Wyoming statute authorized LLPs in 1998, while the Wyoming Supreme 
Court promulgated its approval in 2000.  We continue to refine our understanding of this 
complex process. 
 
State LLC Events LLP Events 
Alabama 10/1/93 (Specific Statute) 1/1/97 (Statute) 
Alaska 7/1/95 (General Statute) 1/1/97 (Statute) 
Arizona 9/30/92 (Specific Statute) 7/17/94 (Statute) 
Arkansas 4/12/93 (Specific Statute) 3/28/97 (Statute) 
California  10/10/95 (Statute) 
Colorado 4/18/90 (General Statute) 
12/1/95 (S. Ct. Rule) 
5/24/95 (Statute) 
12/95 (S.Ct. Rule) 
Connecticut 10/1/93 1/1/96 (Statute) 
Delaware 
10/1/92 (General Statute) 
Mid 90s (Ct. Rule) —  Prohibits 
law-firm LLCs 
5/1/97 (S.Ct. Rule) 
12/1/98 (S.Ct. Rule) —
Amendment 
93 (Statute) — Defers to the S. Ct. to 
decide whether to allow LLPs for attorneys 
5/1/97 (S.Ct. allows it) 
District of 
Columbia 7/23/94 10/15/93 (Statute) 
Florida 
1982 (General Statute) 
10/1/93 (Specific Statute) 
7/1/96 (S.Ct. Rule) 
7/1/95 (Statute) 
7/1/96 (S.Ct. Rule) 
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Georgia 3/1/94 (Specific Statute) 8/29/96 (S. Ct. Rule) 
7/1/95 (Statute) 
8/29/96 (S.Ct. Rule) 
Hawaii 4/1/97 (General Statute) 7/1/99 (S. Ct. Rule) 4/1/97 (Statute) 
Idaho Approx. 6/93 7/1/95 (Statute) 
Illinois 
1/1/94 (General Statute) 
12/31/96 (Statute) — States that 
Supreme Court approval required 
3/1/97 (S. Ct. Rule) 
8/11/94 (Statute) 
(S.Ct.) — Prohibited law-firm LLPs until 
7/1/03 
Indiana 
7/1/93 (Specific Statute) — 
Allows professional LLCs subject to 
authorization by the licensing 
authority 
1/1/98 (Admission and 
Discipline Rule) 
10/1/95 (Statute) 
1/1/998 (S. Ct. Rule) 
Iowa 7/1/92 (Specific Statute) 8/15/94 (Statute) 
Kansas 90 (Specific Statute) 4/7/94 (Statute) — Effective date of publication in statute book 
Kentucky 
7/15/94 (Specific Statute) 
9/22/95 (S. Ct. Order) — 
Prohibits law-firm LLCs 
2/1/00 (S. Ct.) 
7/15/94 (Statute) 
2/1/00 (S. Ct Rule) 
Louisiana 7/7/92 (General Statute) 6/9/93 (Specific Statute) 7/7/92 (Statute) 
Maine 1/1/95 (Specific Statute) 7/3/96 (Statute) 
Maryland 10/1/93 (Specific Statute) 10/1/94 (Statute) 
Massachusetts 
1/1/96 (Specific Statute) 
7/11/96 (S.Ct.) — Implements 
insurance requirements mandated in 
statute 
1/1/96 (Statute) 
1/1/98 (S. Ct. Rule) — Effective date 
may be 10/1/99 
Michigan 6/1/93 (Specific Statute) 10/11/94 (Statute) 
Minnesota 1/1/93 (Specific Statute) 8/1/94 (Statute) 
Mississippi 7/1/94 (Specific Statute) 7/1/95 (Statute) 
Missouri 12/1/93 (General Statute) 1/1/94 (S. Ct. Rule) 8/10/95 (Statute) 




7/93 (Specific Statute) — 
Requires Supreme Court approval 
4/4/94 (Statute) — Makes S.Ct. 
approval necessary 
12/1/99 (S. Ct. Rule) 
7/18/96 (Statute) 
12/1/99 (S. Ct. Rule) 
Nevada 
10/1/91 (General Statute) 
10/1/97 (Statute) — Discusses 
need for licensing agencies to issue 





7/1/93 (Specific Statute) 
7/7/95 (S. Ct Rule) 
2002 (S. Ct Rule) — Amendment 
8/9/96 (Statute) 
New Jersey 
1/26/94 (General Statute) 
9/1/94 (S.Ct. Rule) —  
Prohibits law-firm LLCs 
1/1/97 (S.Ct. Rule) 
6/30/95 (Statute) 
6/30/95 (S. Ct.) — Prohibits law-firm 
LLPs 
1/1/97 (S. Ct. Rule) 
New Mexico 
6/93 (General Statute) 
5/6/94 (State Bar Advisory 
Opinion) — States that express 
statutory authority is required 
6/16/95 (Statute) 
New York 10/24/94 (Specific Statute) 10/24/94 (Statute) 
North 
Carolina 
10/1/93 (Specific Statute) 
12/8/94 (S. Ct. Rule) 
3/6/97 (S. Ct. Rule) — 
Amendment 
10/1/03 (S. Ct. Rule) — 
Amendment 
10/1/93 (Statute) 
North Dakota 8/1/93 (Specific Statute) 3/23/95 (Statute) 
Ohio 7/1/94 (Specific Statute) 11/1/95 (S. Ct. Rule) 
7/1/94 (Statute) 
11/1/95 (S. Ct. Rule) 
Oklahoma 9/1/92 (General Statute) 11/1/95 (Specific Statute) 
11/1/96 (Statute) 
Oregon 5/3/95 (Specific Statute) — Eliminates earlier prohibition 
Pre-1/1/96 (S. Ct. Rule) 
1/1/96 (Statute) 
Pennsylvania 2/5/95 (Specific Statute) 4/29/95 (S. Ct. Rule) 
2/5/95 (Statute) 
4/29/95 (S.Ct. Rule) 
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Rhode Island 7/28/02 (Specific Statute) 6/27/03 (S. Ct. Order) 
7/8/97 (Statute) 
1/1/98 (S. Ct. Rule) 
South 
Carolina 
6/16/94 (Specific Statute) 
6/1/96 (General Statute) — 
Supersedes specific statue 
6/16/94 (Statute) 
South Dakota 7/1/93 (Specific Statute) 7/1/95 (Statute) 
Tennessee 6/21/94 (Specific Statute) 3/1/03 (S. Ct. Rule) 
7/1/95 (Statute) 
Texas 8/26/91 (General Statute) 9/1/93 (Specific Statute) 
8/26/91 (Statute) 
Utah 7/1/91 (Specific Statute) 5/3/94 (Statute) 
Vermont 7/1/96 (Specific Statute) 1/1/99 (Statute) 
Virginia 
7/1/92 (Specific Statute) — 
Eliminates earlier prohibition 
2/1/93 (S.Ct. Rule) 
7/1/95 (S. Ct. Rule) — 
Amendment 
2000 (S. Ct. Rule) — Amendment 
7/1/94 (Statute) 
7/1/95) (S. Ct. Rule) —  Requires 
registration of limited liability law 
practices with the state bar; may be 
effective 2/4/00 or 3/29/00 
Washington 10/1/94 (Specific Statute) 7/1/95 (Statute) 
West Virginia 
3/6/92 (General Statute) 
6/6/96 (Specific Statute) 
10/1/96 (S. Ct. Rule) 
6/6/96 (Statute) 
10/1/96 (S. Ct. Rule) 
Wisconsin 1/1/94 (General Statute) 7/1/97 (S. Ct. Rule) 
12/11/95 (Statute) 
7/1/97 (S.Ct. Rule) 
Wyoming 
1977 (General Statute) 
7/1/93 (Specific Statute) 
8/16/94 (S. Ct.) 
7/1/98 (Statute) 




Table 1: Effective Dates of Limited Liability Forms by State 
State LLC Date LLP Date  State LLC Date LLP Date 
AK Jul-95 Jan-97  MT Oct-93 Oct-95 
AL Oct-93 Jan-97  NC Oct-93 Oct-93 
AR Apr-93 Mar-97  ND Aug-93 Mar-95 
AZ Sep-92 Jul-94  NE Sep-93 Dec-99 
CA N\a Oct-95  NH Jul-93 Aug-96 
CO Dec-95 May-95  NJ Jan-97 Jan-97 
CT Oct-93 Jan-96  NM N\a Jun-95 
DC Jul-94 May-97  NV N\a Oct-95 
DE May-97 Oct-93  NY Oct-94 Oct-94 
FL Oct-93 Jul-96  OH Jul-94 Jul-94 
GA Mar-94 Aug-96  OK Sep-92 Nov-96 
HI Jul-99 Apr-97  OR May-95 Jan-96 
IA Jul-92 Aug-94  PA Feb-95 Feb-95 
ID Jun-93 Jul-95  RI Jul-02 Jan-98 
IL Mar-97 Jul-03  SC Jun-94 Jun-94 
IN Jan-98 Jan-98  SD Jul-93 Jul-95 
KS Jan-90 Apr-94  TN Jun-94 Jul-95 
KY Feb-00 Feb-00  TX Aug-91 Aug-91 
LA Jul-92 Jul-92  UT Jul-91 May-94 
MA Jul-96 Jan-98  VA Jul-92 Jul-94 
MD Oct-93 Oct-94  VT Jul-96 Jan-99 
ME Jan-95 Jul-96  WA Oct-94 Jul-95 
MI Jun-93 Oct-94  WI Jul-97 Jul-97 
MN Jan-93 Aug-94  WV Jun-96 Jun-96 
MO Jan-94 Aug-95  WY Jul-93 Jun-00 




Accounting for the Development of the Longitudinal Sample of Law Firms 
 
Sample Description 1993 Sample 1999 Sample Longitudinal Sample 
Potential firms in 
Law Directory 236134 265154 — 
Exclusion of non-
retired lawyers 
unaffiliated with a 
firm and potentially 
in private practice 
65652 66001 — 
Exclusion of firms of 
size zero 61424 65283 — 
Retention of firms 
with organizational-
form designator not 
listed for the state in 
question in Hillman 
(2003) but always 
corresponding to a 
PC/PA for other 
states 
61424 65283 — 
Exclusion of firms 
with impermissible 
limited-liability form 
61398 65235 — 
Match firms by 
name — — 24352 
Exclusion of 
wrongly matched 
firms with too many 
offices 
— — 24076 
Exclusion of firms 
that convert from GP 
to SP (or vice versa) 
and have one lawyer 
as an SP 





Distributions of Firms by State of Home Office in 1993 and 1999 
 
1993 1999 State No. of firms Share of firms No. of firms Share of firms 
AK 186 0.3 185 0.3 
AL 885 1.4 998 1.5 
AR 514 0.8 559 0.9 
AZ 894 1.5 1,059 1.6 
CA 6,775 11.0 6,706 10.3 
CO 1,360 2.2 1,509 2.3 
CT 1,191 1.9 1,092 1.7 
DC 925 1.5 823 1.3 
DE 163 0.3 177 0.3 
FL 4,332 7.1 5,629 8.6 
GA 1,715 2.8 1,929 3.0 
HI 273 0.4 262 0.4 
IA 740 1.2 758 1.2 
ID 226 0.4 267 0.4 
IL 2,616 4.3 2,971 4.6 
IN 1,078 1.8 983 1.5 
KS 577 0.9 568 0.9 
KY 839 1.4 773 1.2 
LA 1,220 2.0 1,346 2.1 
MA 1,712 2.8 1,728 2.7 
MD 1,144 1.9 1,396 2.1 
ME 283 0.5 298 0.5 
MI 1,875 3.1 2,154 3.3 
MN 985 1.6 1,055 1.6 
MO 1,113 1.8 1,212 1.9 
MS 564 0.9 533 0.8 
MT 262 0.4 283 0.4 
NC 1,390 2.3 1,304 2.0 
ND 160 0.3 153 0.2 
NE 458 0.8 441 0.7 
NH 278 0.5 322 0.5 
NJ 1,968 3.2 2,179 3.3 
NM 415 0.7 488 0.8 
NV 373 0.6 493 0.8 
NY 5,320 8.7 5,320 8.2 
OH 2,191 3.6 2,154 3.3 
OK 1,022 1.7 934 1.4 
OR 673 1.1 721 1.1 
PA 2,572 4.2 2,615 4.0 
RI 251 0.4 264 0.4 
SC 733 1.2 829 1.3 
SD 204 0.3 198 0.3 
TN 1,066 1.7 961 1.5 
TX 3,625 5.9 4,076 6.2 
UT 268 0.4 285 0.4 
VA 1,459 2.4 1,523 2.3 
VT 200 0.3 219 0.3 
WA 967 1.6 1,115 1.7 
WI 841 1.4 909 1.4 
WV 348 0.6 347 0.5 
WY 195 0.3 180 0.3 
Total 61,424 100 65,283 100 
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Table 4: 
Three Measures of a Firm’s Economic Scale in 1993 and 1999 
 
 Firm size (No. of lawyers) No. of offices 
No. of states 
with offices 
Statistic 1993 1999 1993 1999 1993 1999 
Mean 5.53 6.17 1.21 1.32 1.07 1.06 
Standard Deviation 21.6 27.1 0.75 0.91 0.41 0.37 
Median 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 962 1586 30 24 15 14 
5th percentile 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10th percentile 1 1 1 1 1 1 
25th percentile 1 1 1 1 1 1 
75th percentile 4 4 1 1 1 1 
90th percentile 9 9 2 2 1 1 
95th percentile 15 17 2 3 1 1 
 






Distribution of Firms by Broad Organizational Category in 1993 and 1999 
 
 All states States in which LLC or LLP available as of 1999 
Category 1993 1999 1993 1999 
PC/PA 19,916 30,726 19,772 30.462 
LLC 26 2,372 26 2,372 
LLP 264 4,537 264 4,537 
GP 25,916 21,930 25,916 21,498 
SP 14,587 5,670 14,587 5,611 
 
Note:  n=61,398 and 65,235 in 1993 and 1999, respectively.
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Table 6: 
Average Scale of Firms by Broad Organizational Category in 1993 and 1999 
 
 Firm size No. of offices No. of states 
Category 1993 1999 1993 1999 1993 1999 






























































Matching of Firms into Longitudinal Sample 
 
 In 1999 Sample Not in 1999 Sample 
In 1993 Sample 24,352 37,046 
Not in 1993 Sample 40,601 — 
 





Correlation among 1993 and 1999 Measures of Firms’ Economic Scale 
 












Size 1.0000 0.9383 0.5342 0.4694 0.5257 0.5427 
1999 
Size  1.0000 0.4838 0.4028 0.4874 0.4983 
1993 
Offices   1.0000 0.7029 0.6387 0.5587 
1999 
Offices    1.0000 0.4801 0.5433 
1993 
States     1.0000 0.8046 
1999 
States      1.0000 
 





Joint Distribution of Firms by Broad Organizational Category in 1993 and 1999 
 
1993  \  1999 PA/PA LLC LLP GP SP 1993 Total 
PC/PA 8,250 27 24 76 19 8,396 
LLC 0 14 0 0 0 14 
LLP 2 0 105 0 1 108 
GP 617 333 1,225 10,120 0 12,295 
SP 257 6 8 0 1,553 1,824 
1999 Total 9,126 380 1,362 10,196 1,573  
 






Average Firm Size of 1993 GPs by Broad Organizational Category in 1993 and 1999 
 
Average Firm Size Category 1993 1999 
PA/PA 8.47 (1.01) 9.85 (0.92) 
LLC 17.13 (1.68) 22.3 (2.78) 
LLP 40.16 (2.45) 51.1 (3.40) 
GP 6.64 (0.31) 7.62 (0.38) 
 
Note:  n=12,295 for 1993 GPs in states that had permitted LLCs and/or LLPs as of 1999.  Standard errors 





Multinomial-Logit Analysis of Distribution of  
1993 GPs by Broad Organizational Category in 1999 
 
Covariate Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error) 
PC/PA 
Firm size in 1993 6.04e-3*** (1.67e-3) 
Number of states in 1993 -0.179 (0.126) 
State level indicators Included and highly jointly signficant 
LLC 
Firm size in 1993 1.42e-2*** (1.20e-3) 
Number of states in 1993 -0.230 (0.156) 
State level indicators Included and highly jointly significant 
LLP 
Firm size in 1993 2.18e-2*** (1.31e-3) 
Number of states in 1993 -0.380*** (0.9.20e-2) 
State level indicators Included and highly jointly signficant 
Other Statistics 
No. of observations 12,521 
Log likelihood -6900.13 
Pseudo-R squared 0.1285 
Chi-squared statistic on the hypothesis that 
all state indicator variables are zero 2034.98 
Degrees of freedom 156 
 
Notes:  Sample includes all 1993 GPs, including states in which neither LLCs nor LLPs were permitted as 
of 1999.  GP is the excluded category in the multinomial-logit analysis.  * denotes statistical significance at 
the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
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Table 12: 
Average Effect of Firm Size and Number of States with Offices 
on Probability of Converstion by 1993 GPs to LLC and LLP forms as of 1999 
 
Form Firm size in 1993 No. of states in 1993 
LLC 2.40e-2*** (1.00e-2) -0.375 (0.243) 
LLP 0.311*** (2.00e-2) -2.00*** (0.334) 
 
Note:  Share is expressed in percent.  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  * denotes statistical 






Mean and Median Growth Rates among 1993 GPs  
by Broad Organizational Category in 1999 
 
Category Mean Growth Median Growth 
PC/PA 41.1% (6.20) 0 
LLC 27.3% (3.13) 16.7% 
LLP 32.2% (1.77) 23.1% 
GP 14.7% (0.48) 0 
 
Note:  n=12,295 for firms in states that had adopted at least one of the new forms by 1999.  
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. 
 54
Figure 3: 
The Distribution of the Number of Lawyers in a Firm in 1993,  




Note:  n=61,424. 
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Figure 4: 
Median Growth of 1993 GPs that Converted to LLC or LLP Form by 1999, 
By Deciles of Firm Size in 1993 
 
 
Note:  n=1,558.  Outer lines are ninety-five percent confidence bands. 
